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by
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Many commentators assert that enhanced shareholder power is a promising cure
for corporate governance ills. This paper empirically examines the impact of dif-
ferential amounts of shareholder power on governance arrangements. When U.S.
states enacted statutory antitakeover protections in the 1980s, the states differed in
the power granted to shareholders to opt out of the antitakeover protections with-
out agreement by the board of directors. These differences in shareholder power
are associated with little change in governance arrangements. The results sug-
gest that simply altering shareholder power without changing other governance
mechanisms is unlikely to lead to widespread changes in corporate governance.
(JEL: G 34, K 22, D 72)
1 Introduction
Many corporate governance observers believe that enhanced shareholder democracy
and power is a promising cure for governance ills (BEBCHUK [2005]).1 Their argu-
ment is straightforward; principal–agent conflicts imply that management does not
always pursue value maximizing governance arrangements. By “allowing share-
holders to initiate and vote to adopt changes in the company’s basic corporate
governance arrangements,” the inefficiencies associated with the principal–agent
problem will be mitigated (BEBCHUK [2005, p. 836]).
Others disagree. Opponents of shareholder power argue that such power would
be inefficient and that investors would make “little use of the powers” (BAINBRIDGE
[2006, p. 1751]).2 Instead, shareholder power will be used primarily by minor-
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I thank Ian Ayres, Robert Daines,
Simon Deakin, Daniel Ho, Jonathan Klick, Roberta Romano, Alexander Stremitzer,
and participants in JITE’s Kloster Eberbach conference for helpful comments and dis-
cussions and Ian Masias for excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
1 See also BUXBAUM [1985] advocating greater shareholder participation and
power, DENT JR. [1989].
2 See also EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL [1991, p. 82–89], explaining why share-
holders should and do take a quiet role in corporate decisionmaking.
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ity shareholders seeking publicity rather than value maximization (BAINBRIDGE
[1992]).
The debate ultimately rests on an empirical question – can shareholders effectively
use enhanced power to improve governance arrangements? If shareholders can use
democracy to improve governance, then the resulting benefits likely outweigh the
costs of expanding the set of corporate decision makers. If greater shareholder
power does not lead to changes in corporate governance and power is exploited for
inefficient purposes, however, then shareholder power should not be increased.
In spite of the empirical nature of the question, there are few studies of whether
shareholders use greater power to implement changes in governance arrangements.
This paper studies this question by examining the impact of variations in share-
holder power. In the middle and late 1980s, one of the most salient questions of
corporate law regarded the efficiency of various state anti-takeover statutes. Many
states passed default statutes, such as control share acquisition, business combina-
tion, and fair price statutes, that hindered the ability of an acquirer to effectively take
control of a target corporation. While the language of the antitakeover statutes was
similar, they differed in one important respect – the degree to which shareholder
democracy could alter these antitakeover defaults. Some states required charter
amendments to opt out of the default antitakeover provisions, restricting the abil-
ity of shareholder democracy to change governance arrangements because charter
amendments require board approval. Other states, by contrast, allowed opting-out
via shareholder initiated bylaw amendments, thereby enabling shareholder democ-
racy to alter the default rule without managerial acquiescence.
If greater shareholder power enables shareholders to optimally adjust governance
regimes, then the variation in opt-out procedures (also known as altering rules)
(charter amendment v. bylaw) should lead to differences in antitakeover statute
opt-out rates, other things equal.
Corporate opt-out rates show that this is not the case, however. Opt-out rates for
anti-takeover statutes are very low in all states and are independent of the opt-out
mechanism (DECONINCK [2005]). Granting greater shareholder power by allowing
shareholders to unilaterally opt out of a statutory governance arrangement via bylaw
does not lead to higher corporate opt-out rates compared with companies in states
that require board approved charter amendments.
Moreover, the low opt-out rates from the antitakeover statutes cannot simply be
attributed to the universal desirability of the statutes – most companies in states with
no antitakeover statute or with opt-in statutes generally do not choose to write such
protection into their charter (LISTOKIN [2009]).
The results indicate that increasing shareholder power by enabling shareholders to
alter governance terms unilaterally via bylaw amendment does not cause sharehold-
ers to significantly change governance terms. This may be the result of two causes.
One possibility is that corporations arrive at efficient governance arrangements in-
dependent of shareholders’ ability to alter governance. The marked difference in
antitakeover protection rates across states with different default laws casts doubt
on this explanation. So does the fact that the passage of control share acquisition
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statutes and business combination statutes is associated with a decline in stock mar-
ket value for companies incorporated in states passing the statutes (KARPOFF AND
MALATESTA [1989]).3 Given these sources of evidence, a more likely explanation
of the results is that antitakeover statutes allow management an inefficient level of
power, but that granting shareholders the power to alter governance unilaterally does
not provide shareholders with enough power and/or incentives to go about changing
the inefficient terms.
Anecdotal evidence also contradicts the arguments of proponents of the status
quo, who argue that increased shareholder power will benefit special interests such
as advocacy groups with little interest in maximizing corporate value and lead to
widespread inefficiencies. The increase in shareholder power associated with the
ability to opt out of antitakeover statutes via bylaw does not appear to have been
associated with any such behavior by special interests. Thus, the empirical evidence
suggests that both the benefits and the costs of increased shareholder power may be
overstated by the protagonists of the shareholder power debate.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the literature on optimal share-
holder power in more detail. Section 3 briefly describes the antitakeover statutes
examined in the paper. Section 4 describes the data and presents summary statis-
tics, while section 5 discusses the appropriate regression specification. Section 6
discusses and interprets the regression analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Should Shareholder Power be Expanded?
Most corporate governance arrangements derive from two sources – corporate char-
ters and the state of incorporation’s corporate laws (BEBCHUK [2005]). To amend
a corporation’s charter, state law requires board initiation and board submission
to a shareholder vote of any proposed amendments.4 To alter the state of incorpo-
ration, a company commonly merges with a shell corporation incorporated in the
desired state (BEBCHUK [2005]). To complete the merger, the board must initiate
a shareholder vote (BEBCHUK [2005]).
As a result, shareholders have little say over the basic governance arrangements
of a corporation. Any major changes in these arrangements require board approval.
Critics state that this is inefficient. If a governance arrangement is inefficient but
suits the board of directors, there will be almost no way to change it because any
change initiated by shareholders must be approved by the board (BEBCHUK AND
HAMDANI [2002]). Bebchuk provides a specific statutory example of such a scenario
– Delaware’s antitakeover statute.5 Bebchuk asserts that management has no incen-
tive to opt out of the statute because it protects management. Shareholders might
3 The event study evidence also casts doubt on explanations of differential opt-out
rates being caused by separating equilibria associated with signaling models.
4 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8 Sec. 242(b).
5 BEBCHUK [2005, p. 862], discussing Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1989).
If you Give Shareholders Power(2010) 41
want to opt out, but they cannot because the statute requires a charter amendment
to opt out and charter amendments require board approval (BEBCHUK [2005]).
Critics of the status quo want to expand shareholder power so that inefficient
arrangements can be altered by shareholders without management approval. There
are several ways this can be accomplished. One mechanism to increase shareholder
power is to expand the use of bylaws in corporate governance.6 Bylaw amendments
may be unilaterally initiated by shareholders, but at present the ability of bylaws to
alter governance arrangements is quite limited (HAMERMESH [1998]). If the scope
of bylaw amendments is expanded as urged by BEBCHUK [2005], however, then
shareholders will be able to alter governance arrangements more easily. A second
means to expand shareholder power is to allow shareholders to unilaterally initiate
and approve charter amendments (BEBCHUK [2005]). Because charter amendments
enable corporations to specify their own governance arrangements and alter state
default arrangements, allowing unilateral shareholder charter amendments would
similarly enable shareholder to independently alter governance arrangements.
With reference to Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute, BEBCHUK AND HAMDANI
[2002] have suggested that the Delaware antitakeover statute would have been
much less pernicious if it would have allowed opting-out via bylaw. Bylaw opt-out
would have allowed shareholders to unilaterally opt out of the statute’s protections.
Expanding bylaw’s scope or shareholder’s power to amend the corporate charter
has some obvious benefits in terms of reducing principal–agent problems. These
proposals may also have considerable costs, however. As Bainbridge explains
“Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to disrupt the very
mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the cen-
tralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board of directors.
The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that it permits the aggregation
of large capital pools, as some have suggested, but rather that it provides a hierarchical de-
cisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of operating a large business enterprise
with numerous employees, managers, shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies. In
such an enterprise, someone must be in charge: ‘Under conditions of widely dispersed in-
formation and the need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is
essential for success.”’ (BAINBRIDGE [2006, p. 1749])
Moreover, many question the utility of allowing shareholders to unilaterally opt
out of governance arrangements. Although enabling unilateral opt-out eliminates
one impediment to shareholder activity, there are still many other hindrances. For
example, Romano argues, in contrast to Bebchuk, that bylaw opt-outs will be in-
effective in the state antitakeover statute context because of shareholder free-rider
problems (ROMANO [1993, pp. 56]).7
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the issue, see HAMERMESH [1998]. See also
COFFEE JR. [1997] examining the question of whether bylaws can repeal poison pills.
7 BAINBRIDGE [2006] also argues that other costs of shareholder activism mean
that expanding shareholder power will not lead to a meaningful reduction in principal
agent costs.
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Whatever the costs of expanded shareholder power, it is clear that there are large-
scale disagreements about its potential benefit. Supporters of expanded shareholder
power assert that when shareholders can make unilateral changes, governance ar-
rangements will change substantially. Opponents, however, claim that such changes
will make little practical difference and simply complicate the governance process.
The remainder of this paper attempts to test these competing assertions with data
from corporate opt-out rates from state antitakeover statutes.
3 State Antitakeover Statutes
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
upholding the state of Indiana’s control share acquisition statutes, many states
passed a number of different antitakeover statutes in the late 1980s (ISAACS [2004]).
The large majority of these statutes were passed as default rules. These statutes
hindered hostile bidders from easily obtaining control of a target corporation. This
paper focuses on two types of popular antitakeover statutes, Business Combination
statutes, and Control Share Acquisition statutes.8 State passage of both types of
statute was associated with a decrease in market value for firms incorporated in
that state (KARPOFF AND MALATESTA [1989]). Because the debate about corporate
law altering rules focuses on shareholder adopted bylaws, companies in states that
allowed board approved bylaws but not shareholder approved bylaws are excluded
from the “bylaw” category.
Corporations could (and did) obtain CSA and business combination protection
without statutes by writing such provisions directly into their charters or bylaws.
3.1 Business Combination Statutes
Business combination statutes, also known as “freeze-out” statutes, prohibit certain
types of transactions (such as mergers or asset sales) between a large shareholder
and a target company for a multi-year period after the large shareholder’s stake
exceeds a pre-specified amount. Board approval can enable the transactions to move
forward during the prohibited period. Business combination statutes prevent bidders
from obtaining the full benefit of their acquisition for a long period following the
initial acquisition, and thereby deter bids. Many business combination statutes were
passed in conjunction with fair price statutes.
Twenty-eight states enacted business combination default laws. The altering rule
for these statutes varied considerably. 17 states allowed opting-out through bylaw
amendments, while 11 required charter amendments for a company to opt out. The
voting threshold for opting out also varied widely. While 18 states required a simple
majority of outstanding shares to approve the bylaw or charter amendment necessary
8 Because fair price statutes were often passed in concert with business combina-
tion statutes, this paper focuses attention on business combination statutes exclusively.
For more detail on fair price statutes, see LISTOKIN [2009].
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for opting out, 6 states required two-thirds supermajorities and 3 states required even
greater supermajorities.9 The states also varied in the speed with which an opt-out
became effective. Ten states allowed the statutory opt-out to become effective as
soon as the required bylaw or charter was passed. 12 states, however, delayed the
effectiveness of the opt-out for one year, while the remaining states had even longer
delays.10
3.2 Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Control share acquisition statutes provide that acquisition of a controlling block of
shares does not ensure voting control. This deters the acquisition of control blocks
by bidders because the bidders cannot be confident that their control can ever be
exercised.
Indiana’s control share acquisition (CSA) statute, at issue in CTS, is representa-
tive. The statute stipulates that the acquirer of 20, 33, or 50% of a company’s shares
must obtain the approval of a majority of the disinterested shares before the acquirer
can exercise voting rights of the control stake. If voting rights fail to be approved,
the company can reacquire the shares from the bidder at the market price.
Twenty-seven states enacted CSA default statutes. Eighteen allowed opting-out
through changes to the bylaws, seven required charter amendments, and two states
allowed the board to opt out via bylaw but otherwise required charter amendments
for opting out.11 With one exception, all of these statutes require the vote of a majority
of the shares outstanding to opt out, and impose no delay on opting-out after a vote.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), now part of RiskMetrics,
gathers biennial data on a myriad of antitakeover features for a large group of com-
panies in its Corporate Takeover Defense Database. This data includes information
on the existence of poison pills, classified boards, and golden parachutes, among
many other provisions. The dataset includes information on whether a company is
incorporated in a state that has enacted a default law fair price, business combina-
tion, or control share acquisition statute, and whether a company has opted out of
the statute.12
The IRRC data was supplemented with data from several other sources. The data
on each company from IRRC was matched with detailed company level data from
9 In the data analysis that follows, the states that allow bylaw opt-out via different
majorities are lumped together in the bylaw opt-out category. The supermajority re-
quirements make no observable difference to opt-out rates.
10 In the data analysis that follows, the states that delayed the effectiveness of an
opt-out are lumped together with states that did not impose such a delay. The differ-
ence in delay for opt-out effectiveness makes no observable difference to opt-out rates.
11 States that only allow board bylaw opt-out are excluded from the analysis.
12 For more details about the dataset, see GOMPERS, ISHII, AND METRICK [2003].
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Compustat and CRSP.13 Initial CRSP appearance dates were used to determine if
a company was publicly traded when antitakeover statutes were passed. Finally,
additional data on the nature of each state’s altering rule, such as whether or not
a bylaw or charter amendment was needed to opt out of the statute, the majority
necessary to opt out, and whether or not opt-outs were subjects to delay, was
obtained from the statutes as well as the detailed descriptions of the antitakeover
laws in IRRC’s series on State Takeover Laws (ISAACS [2004]). With respect to the
bylaw/charter distinction, it is important to note that some states (e.g. PA) allowed
opt-out via a bylaw amendment passed by the board of directors, but not by the
shareholders. For purposes of shareholder power, the board requirement makes the
PA statute more similar to a statute requiring charter amendment opt-out than bylaw
amendment opt-out.14 As a result, the PA opt-out is treated as requiring charter
opt-out.
Companies generally choose between two possibilities for their state of incor-
poration – Delaware or their principal place of business (DAINES [2002]). Because
Delaware firms are thus “different” from firms that incorporate in their place of busi-
ness, the empirical analysis below generally displays results including and excluding
companies incorporated in Delaware.
Table 1 presents summary statistics.15 20% of all companies, and 50% of all
companies not incorporated in Delaware, enjoy CSA protection, while 89% of com-
panies and 78% of non Delaware companies, enjoy business combination protection.
Note that almost all of these companies are protected via statute rather than “do-it-
yourself” charter or bylaw amendment. Companies incorporated in states without
CSA statutes, who must enact their own amendment, enjoy CSA protection less
than 1% of the time, while companies incorporated in states without BC statutes,
who also must enact their own amendment, enjoy BC protection less than 5% of the
time.
With respect to both statutes, most companies incorporated in states with anti-
takeover statutes can opt out of the statute via bylaw amendment, granting enhanced
shareholder power. A non trivial number (7.5% of companies in non Delaware CSA
states and 25% of companies in non Delaware BC states) must opt out by charter,
meaning that amendment can only take place with board approval. Companies that
went public after all the statutes were passed have lower rates of CSA protection
and are more likely to be found in bylaw opt-out states than the average company,
though the differences are not overly large.
13 Imperfect merging and missing data mean that data analysis using the Compustat
data relies on fewer observations than other specifications.
14 Charter amendments, unlike board passed bylaws, always need shareholder
approval, creating a technical distinction between board passed bylaws and char-
ter amendments. There is no case, however, of a board proposing to opt out of an
antitakeover statute and the shareholders refusing.
15 Because data from the same firm is extremely highly correlated (nearly one), all
data analysis includes only one observation per firm to avoid understating standard er-
rors.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
All companies Non Companies
Delaware going public
companies after 1992
Percent of total companies 100% 40% 37%
Proportion covered by 0.20 0.50 0.13
CSA antitakeover provision
Proportion covered by 0.89 0.78 0.88
bus. comb. antitakeover provision
Proportion of companies 0.17 0.44 0.11
incorporated in states with
CSA statute alterable by
bylaw amendment
Proportion of companies 0.029 0.075 0.016
incorporated in states with
CSA statute alterable by
charter amendment
Proportion of companies 0.774 0.43 0.85
incorporated in states with
bus. comb. statute alterable by
bylaw amendment
Proportion of companies 0.099 0.25 0.051
incorporated in states with
bus. comb. statute alterable by
charter amendment
Proportion covered by 0.54 0.54 0.49
poison pill
Proportion going public after 1992 0.37 0.23 1
Median market value $769 million $820 million $632 million
Number of companies 3140 1246 1161
Notes: Summary statistics for the entire sample of companies (column 1) and two relevant
subgroups of companies – companies not incorporated in Delaware (column 2) and com-
panies that went public after the passage of all Control Share Acquisition (CSA) and Busi-
ness Combination (BC) statutes (column 3). Rows present the number of companies in the
group relative to the total number of companies, the number of companies benefitting from
CSA or BC competition (including companies that obtain such protection directly via pass-
ing their own amendment), the proportion of the total number of companies that are incor-
porated in states with CSA or BC statutes that allow opt-out via bylaw amendment or only
via charter amendment, the proportion of companies in each sample covered by poison pill,
the median market value of the companies and the total number of companies.
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Table 2 examines the summary statistics in greater detail to demonstrate several
findings of interest. First, note that opt-out rates for all statutes are low. This is
particularly so for business combination and fair price statutes, which have opt-out
rates below 5%. Protection rates for companies not covered by antitakeover statutes,
by contrast, are extremely low, suggesting that the antitakeover provisions are not
retained exclusively because they are efficient for all companies. Thus, antitakeover
protections represent a paradigmatic case for the benefits of increasing shareholder
power. State law entails a seemingly undesirable default law – a rule that depresses
market value and that companies would not enact on their own – that is unlikely to
be changed by management because it benefits management. Greater shareholder
power should enable shareholders to alter the undesirable antitakeover provisions
without managerial interference, causing substantial differences in governance be-
tween bylaw and charter states.
Table 2
Antitakeover Statute Coverage Rates
Control share acquisition statutes Business combination statutes
(proportion of firms in each (proportion of firms in each
category enjoying category enjoying
CSA protection) BC protection)
Opt-out all firms non Delaware firms all firms non Delaware firms
mechanism
Charter 81.7% 81.7% 96.8% 96.8%
amendment only (4.0) (4.0) (1.1) (1.1)
Bylaw or charter 87.6% 87.6% 96.4% 95.7%
amendment (1.4) (1.4) (0.3) (0.8)
No statute 0.1% 0.8% 5.0% 5.0%
(0.08) (0.4) (1.3) (1.3)
Notes: Antitakeover statute coverage rates for firms characterized by the intersection of the
row and column headings. Standard errors of the coverage rate estimate are in parentheses.
Table 2 fails to support the notion that increased shareholder power, in the form of
bylaw altering rules rather than charter amendment altering rules, changes outcomes.
Companies opt out of business combination statutes at nearly identical (low) rates
in both charter amendment and bylaw amendment states. This result is not sensitive
to the inclusion or exclusion of Delaware companies. Companies required to opt
out via charter amendment or board directed bylaw amendment opt-out of CSA
protection at higher rates than companies in shareholder bylaw opt-out states.16
16 Note that the high opt-out rate for board passed bylaw amendments reflects the
inclusion within this category of Pennsylvania, which passed a notoriously restrictive
antitakeover law that prompted many companies to opt out (BEBCHUCK AND COHEN
[2003]).
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This again fails to support the hypothesis that greater shareholder power should lead
to higher opt-out rates from antitakeover statutes.
5 Regression Specification
While the summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that different altering rules
and degrees of shareholder power have little effect on outcomes, these statistics
should be viewed warily. Selection bias and omitted variable bias may cause sys-
tematic differences in antitakeover provision opt-out rates between companies in
different states. Simply put, companies in states with one type of altering rule may
be systematically different from companies in states with a different altering rule.
If this is the case, then differences in antitakeover provision adoption rates can-
not be attributed to differences in corporate laws, but might be due to these other
differences.
This concern, while real, should not be overstated. If the effect of shareholder
power is sufficiently large, then it should be detectable in spite of the endogeneity
problem. The increase in protection rates associated with the enactment of a state
antitakeover default law, for example, is so large that it is unlikely that any plausible
selection effect could have caused it or have made it disappear. Even if the sum-
mary statistics do not prove a causal effect, the finding of no association between
shareholder power and governance arrangements should shift the burden of proof
regarding the impacts of shareholder power.
In addition, there are several reasons to think that the endogeneity problems
described above may not be particularly severe. First, selection of state of incorpo-
ration is not as fluid as one might expect. Companies either choose Delaware or their
“home” state – where their headquarters is located (DAINES [2002]). Thus, compa-
nies that stay in their home state are defined more by inertia than a desire to select the
corporate law that suits their manager’s interests. Second, many of the statutes were
passed to protect one particular company from a takeover. For example, Minnesota’s
control share acquisition and business combination statutes were developed by Min-
nesota corporation Dayton Hudson to prevent a hostile takeover, and was amended
when the provisions proved to be an obstacle to a friendly merger for Tonka, another
Minnesota company (ISAACS [2004]). Many other state antitakeover statutes have
similar origins.17 The statutes were therefore targeted at specific companies rather
than being related to the average corporation from the state. Therefore, the choice
of altering rule for each statute is more likely to reflect the idiosyncratic needs of an
individual company than it is to reflect systematic differences between the types of
companies incorporated in the state.18
17 See ISAACS [2004] for a discussion of the history behind many of the statutes.
18 The states in which such idiosyncratic passage was most salient were identified
and the regression models described below were applied exclusively to these states,
with little change in outcomes.
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Third, selection effects should bias the results in favor of finding a difference
caused by altering rules, rather than no difference. If companies hoping to re-
ject shareholder opinion choose states of incorporation that are likely to restrict
shareholder power with restrictive altering rules such as a requirement for charter
amendments, then comparing opt-out rates for different altering rules should reveal
a large apparent effect. Opt-out rates in charter amendment states should be lower
for two reasons: (1) the actual effect of the differential altering rules and (2) the
selection effect caused by companies choosing states that fit their preferences. Thus,
the observed impact of the difference in altering rules should be upwardly biased.
Fourth, the paper tries several different specifications to further reduce the poten-
tial for omitted variables and selection effects to bias the results. The regressions
are restricted to companies in states with antitakeover default laws. The basic linear
probability model is:19
Ycs = α + Xcsβ + δ altering_rules + εcs ,(1)
where Ycs indicates whether or not company c has opted out of a particular anti-
takeover protection of state s (= 1 if the company has opted out), Xcs is a vector
of control variables, including company size, profitability, census division dummies
(because the source of variation is state level, state controls cannot be used in this
specification), debt levels, industry dummies, a dummy for whether the company
went public before or after the passage of the statute, and, in some specifications,
measures of other governance features,20 such as the presence of a poison pill or
staggered board, the existence of golden-parachute provisions, a measure of directo-
rial independence, the existence of secret balloting, and the existence of cumulative
voting provisions. Delaware corporations are excluded from all specifications. The
primary variable of interest is altering_rules – a dummy variable indicating whether
the company is located in a state with a bylaw opt-out altering rule (= 1). Because
of incredibly high correlation for governance terms within companies (over 99% of
companies retain their initial choice on opting in or out of the statutes throughout
the time period), I present regressions with only one observation per company (firm
averages) to avoid overstating standard errors.21 Only companies in states with an-
titakeover statutes that can be altered by bylaw or charter amendment are included
in the regressions.
While this specification controls for many possible confounding factors, it re-
mains possible that companies in states allowing opt-out via bylaw amendment are
unobservably different from companies in states requiring charter amendments to
opt out. To address this issue, I focus on the difference between firms that went
19 Applying a logit specification has little impact on the results. I prefer the linear
probability model in this case because it is easier to interpret.
20 Poison pills and staggered board controls are not included in most specifica-
tions due to the fact that these might act as substitutes for the antitakeover protections
studied here.
21 This corresponds to the “between” estimator of a panel data random effects
model. See JOHNSTON AND DINARDO [1997, pp. 392f.].
If you Give Shareholders Power(2010) 49
public before the state statutes were passed (“midstream companies”) and firms that
went public afterwards. The choice of altering rule should have a much larger affect
on midstream companies than other companies. Because companies going public
after the statute’s passage internalize the cost of the antitakeover provisions, they
should opt out of the statutes whenever they are inefficient, regardless of the altering
rule. Placing this assumption into a regression framework,
Ycs = α + Xcsβ + σ midstream_dummyc + δ altering_rules
+ γ altering_rules × midstream_dummyc + εcs ,
(2)
where midstream_dummyc is a dummy variable indicating if a firm was already
public when the antitakeover statute was passed. Theory predicts that the coefficient
on this dummy variable will be positive, as firms that go public after the statutes
passage have a strong financial incentive to opt out only if the statute hurts value.
altering_rules × midstream_dummyc is an interaction term between being in an
altering rule state and being a midstream company when the statute was passed have
been added to the original specification. If altering rules are important for midstream
firms, then the coefficient on this interaction term should be statistically significant,
reflecting the fact that the difference in altering rules is most salient for midstream
firms. If all firms (midstream and non-midstream) in different altering rule states
are unobservably different in their likelihood to have antitakeover protections, then
this should be reflected in the coefficient on the altering_rules dummy variable.
6 Results and Interpretation
Table 3 presents the results of several regression specifications estimating the impact
of various factors on the likelihood of opting out of a business combination statute.
The results are broadly similar across all the specifications. With the exception of
the controls for industry, year, and census division, very few of the control variables
for financial performance or type of firm are statistically or practically significant.22
The results fail to provide considerable support for the notion that altering rules
placing more power in the hands of shareholders lead to more efficient arrangements.
In the cross-sectional regressions corresponding to equation (1), (columns 2 and 3),
the ability to opt out of a statute via bylaw is not associated with any change in
the probability of opting out of an antitakeover statute relative to needing a charter
amendment for opt-out. This non association between shareholder power and opt-
out rate remains the case after controlling for many factors, such as a firm’s industry
and size.
As described above, the simple cross-sectional regressions do not control for
unobservable differences in propensity to opt out of antitakeover statutes that are
22 Restricting the regression results presented below to firms making losses, who
should be the most likely to resist antitakeover protections, does not appreciably alter
the results – in these alternative specifications (available on request) the ability to opt
out via bylaw is not associated with a statistically or practically significant change in
opt-out rates.
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Table 3
Regression Outcomes: Business Combination Statutes
Coefficient Base case Control Base case Control Excludes
variables with variables Delaware
interaction and
term interaction
term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Allows opt-out 0.0055 −0.0061 −0.036 −0.039 −0.063∗
via bylaw (0.010) (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.034)
Midstream firm −0.028∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.064∗∗ −0.062∗∗
(0.010) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025)
Bylaw opt-out 0.046∗ 0.035 0.050
interacted with (0.026) (0.032) (0.034)
midstream status
Financial no yes no yes Yes
controls
Industry no yes no yes Yes
controls
Census division no yes no yes Yes
controls
Observations 2728 1546 2715 1546 561
R2 0.000 0.040 0.008 0.028 0.040
Notes: Dependent variable equals one if company is covered by a business combination
statute and equals zero if the company is not covered. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Financial Controls include log of market value, log of
annual income, market-to-book ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio. Columns 3, 5, and 6 include
many fewer observations because of the imprecise matching between Compustat data and
IRRC data.
correlated with the altering rule of a firm’s state of incorporation.23 The simple cross-
sectional regressions, however, provide support for the assumption that underlies
the specification in equation (2) – midstream firms are less likely to opt out of
their states’ antitakeover statutes, suggesting that the choice of altering rule is most
important for midstream firms. This enables equation (2) to control for unobserved
differences using firms that go public after the passage of the statute.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 3, which present various specifications corresponding
to equation (2), suggest that firms in bylaw opt-out states are generally less likely
23 The presence of statutes is least likely to be endogenous to the type of corpo-
rations incorporated in the state when the statute was passed to protect one company
specifically. Regressions focusing on these states show no discernible impact of opt-
out rules on governance.
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Table 4
Regression Outcomes: Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Coefficient Base case Control Base case Control
variables with variables and
interaction interaction
term term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Allows opt-out via 0.028 0.017 0.049 −0.0025
bylaw (0.038) (0.046) (0.080) (0.11)
Midstream firm 0.033 −0.0129 0.016
(0.042) (0.084) (0.11)
Bylaw opt-out −0.027 0.021
interacted with (0.091) (0.12)
midstream status
Financial controls no yes no Yes
Industry controls no yes no Yes
Census division controls no yes no Yes
Observations 634 428 634 428
R2 0.001 0.144 0.003 0.143
Notes: Dependent variable equals one if company is covered by a control share acquisition
statute and equals zero if the country is not covered. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p <
0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Financial Controls include log of market value, log of annual
income, market-to-book ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio. Columns 3, 5, and 6 include many
fewer observations because of the imprecise matching between Compustat data and IRRC
data.
to opt out of antitakeover statutes than firms in charter opt-out states, even after
controlling for other factors. Firms that went public after the passage of business
combination statutes from states with bylaw opt-out are from 3–6% (depending
on the specification) less likely to opt out than firms in charter opt-out states, in
spite of the fact that all firms going public after the passage of the statute have
strong financial incentives to opt out regardless of the altering rule in their state of
incorporation.
After controlling for this differential propensity to opt out of business combination
laws, there is mixed evidence for the thesis that increasing shareholder power
has impacts. Midstream firms in bylaw opt-out states (who have greater power)
are approximately 3.5%–5% (depending on the specification) more likely to opt
out of business combination protection than similar firms that must opt out via
charter. This difference is noteworthy, and provides some support for the argument
that shareholder’s use of shareholder power to alter governance arrangements in
shareholder’s favor. Two important caveats must be emphasized, however. First,
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the increase in opt-out percentage is not statistically significant at the 5% level
(though in some of the specifications it is significant at the 10% level). Second, an
increase of 4% in opt-out rates, while noteworthy and large compared to overall low
opt-out rates of approximately 5%, is very small compared to the impact of having
a statute at all. In earlier work, I demonstrated that the total absence of a business
combination statute lowers coverage rates for midstream firms by over 90%, while
the existence of a business combination statute as a non-default menu option rather
than a default law reduces coverage rates by 23% (LISTOKIN [2009]). The increase
in opt-out rates associated with increased shareholder power pales in comparison
with these numbers.
The results for control share acquisition statutes (Table 4) provide further ev-
idence that increased shareholder power is at best a small factor in determining
governance arrangements. The ability to opt out via bylaw is not associated with
any significant change (in both the statistical and practical senses) in the number of
firms opting out of CSA protection. This non association holds true for midstream
firms as well as all firms. Indeed, almost no variables of any sort, including financial
and industry controls, are associated with CSA opt-out in any significant manner.
The non predictability of CSA protection is consistent across a range of different
regression specifications, as demonstrated in Table 4.
7 Conclusion
If shareholder power is an important input into corporate governance arrangements,
as some have argued, then large differences in shareholder power with respect
to important governance measures should lead to differences in governance. In
particular, shareholder’s ability to unilaterally opt out of prominent state antitakeover
statutes should lead to significantly higher opt-out rates relative to companies where
shareholders did not enjoy such power. The results presented in this paper, however,
indicate that this difference in power is associated with little, if any, changes in
governance. Relative to the impact of passing an antitakeover statute, enabling
greater shareholder power in the application of the statute has very little impact.24
It should also be emphasized, however, that the increased shareholder power
associated with the ability to opt out via bylaw was not associated with widespread
manipulation of shareholder power to further narrow interests such as those of
unions or other interest groups.
In total, these results suggest that the heated predictions and emotions associated
with the debate regarding shareholder power are overwrought. Taken alone, this
instance of increased shareholder power made very little difference. The findings,
however, should not be taken to mean that shareholder power is irrelevant. In addition
to the usual caveats about endogeneity limiting causal inference, it is also possible
to view increased shareholder power as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for
24 While it is possible that merely the threat of bylaw opt-out alters corporate be-
havior, the data gives no hint of such an effect.
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improved governance. That is, increasing shareholder power without making other
reforms to governance may not have an impact, but a failure to increase shareholder
power may prevent the benefits of other corporate governance reforms, such as
increased shareholder activism, from being realized.
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